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On 3 May 2011 the UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
passed a resolution on the “Participation of the Eu-
ropean Union in the work of the United Nations”1 in 
order to upgrade the role of the European Union 
within the UNGA and to bring it in line with the re-
forms in the Lisbon Treaty. It was a political decision 
taken at the highest echelons of the EU to press for 
the adoption of this resolution at all costs, despite an 
adverse political environment in New York. The EU 
High Representative Catherine Ashton saw the res-
olution as a hard-won victory for the EU, stating that 
“The Resolution will in future enable EU representa-
tives to present and promote the EU’s positions in 
the UN, as agreed by its Member States.”
This contribution discusses the political and practi-
cal consequences of the resolution, and whether the 
EU has achieved its goal to enhance its participation 
within the UNGA. We argue that despite the efforts 
by the EU Delegation and the EU High Representa-
tive herself, this watered-down resolution fails to 
meet its original purpose. The politically central goal 
set by the EU in trying to obtain enhanced observer 
status at the UNGA was to improve its leverage and 
visibility as a global actor, codetermining develop-
ments on the international plane. This was in line 
with the letter and spirit of the Lisbon Treaty, which 
foresees a stronger external representation of the 
EU through the President of the European Council, 
the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy (HR) and the EU Delegations 
adding to the European Commission. However, the 
final version adopted by the UNGA only secures 
speaking rights for President Herman van Rompuy 
and HR Catherine Ashton at the UN ministerial ple-
nary meetings, which take place at the beginning of 
each regular season of the GA, whereas it unac-
ceptably qualifies the actual participation rights of 
the EU in the everyday work of the GA and, thereby, 
its capacity to influence decisions of this UN organ.
the resolution
The EU first attempted to upgrade its role in the 
UNGA in September 2010. The EU’s failure at the 
time to secure enhanced rights was blamed on both 
a poor diplomatic effort on behalf of the EU, as well 
as a surprising level of resistance from other States 
to the proposal. The EU came back to the table with 
a renewed effort to secure “enhanced observer sta-
tus” and was able to get a resolution passed, albeit 
with many important amendments and concessions 
(explained in detail below). The Resolution was 
pass ed with 180 votes in favour, and none against. 
Zimbabwe and Syria abstained, while ten States did 
not record a vote: Azerbaijan, Côte d’Ivoire, Kiribati, 
Libya, Nauru, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Vanuatu 
and Venezuela.
Mediterranean Politics | Europe
The Lisbon Treaty and the Status
of the European Union in the 
International Arena: The May 2011 
Upgrade at the UN General Assembly
1 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/65/L.64/Rev.1.
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The Resolution passed in New York on 3 May 2011 
bears surprisingly little resemblance to the draft of 
September 2010. Notably, all references to the Lis-
bon Treaty have been removed. The Resolution no 
longer makes any reference to the benefits of re-
gional integration, or to the long-standing relations 
between the EU and the UN, which appeared in the 
first draft. The Resolution gives no background or 
context whatsoever regarding why such participa-
tion rights are necessary. In essence, the European 
proposal was utterly de-Europeanised.
Most importantly, however, the participation rights 
that the EU ‘won’ remain less than what is needed 
under Lisbon for the EU to truly behave as a global 
actor within the UN. The EU has secured the right to 
be inscribed on the list of speakers together with the 
representatives of major groups, and to have its 
communications circulated directly as documents of 
the UNGA. As to the former, the practice in New 
York is for the President of the UNGA to determine 
the exact order of the list of speakers. In accordance 
with the Resolution, the President will now be able 
to give the floor to the EU representative earlier in 
the discussion. This means that the EU delegation in 
New York will have to negotiate each summer with 
the office of the President in order to secure a speak-
ing slot among the first speakers at the UN ministe-
rial plenary meetings in September.
The Resolution further provides that the EU also has 
a right to reply “as decided by the presiding officer,” 
which is restricted to just once per item. However, 
the EU has no right to challenge decisions of the 
presiding officer and is therefore incapable of de-
fending itself in case of perceived arbitrary decisions 
taken by the latter. Additionally, the EU has no right 
to raise a point of order, nor to vote, nor to put for-
ward candidates in the UNGA.
Furthermore, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Lis-
bon Treaty, the EU has willingly conditioned its capac-
ity to voice its view in the UNGA even on issues 
touching upon its own (exclusive or exercise shared) 
competences on the “agree[ment] by the Member 
States of the European Union.” In addition, it can only 
make proposals and amendments orally and these 
“shall be put to vote only at the request of a Member 
State.” It may be noted here that this outcome may 
serve the foreign policy of some EU Member States, 
which insist on denying the competence of the EU 
Delegations to represent them in international fora. It 
remains to be seen whether a restrictive interpretation 
of this resolution may be used as a precedent by such 
Member States in other international organisations.
Thus, in practical terms the EU has only gained the 
right to present its views at the UNGA before its own 
nameplate. In all other aspects it is procedurally 
handicapped and still has to rely on its Member 
States to promote its agenda in the UNGA. It has 
agreed to remain in the backseat in international re-
lations behind its Member States, cementing a long-
standing – but unacceptable in post-Lisbon terms 
– modus operandi in the UNGA. The EU spent valu-
able political capital and lost the political impetus 
from the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, all 
for a resolution that fails to achieve its original goal.
Effect in other Un organs and bodies
The enhanced rights that the EU now enjoys within the 
UNGA will also flow on to some other bodies related 
to the UNGA. This is because the Resolution states 
that the modalities of participation also apply within the 
General Assembly’s “committees and working groups, 
in international meetings and conferences convened 
under the auspices of the Assembly and in United Na-
tions conferences.” The subsidiary organs of the Gen-
eral Assembly include Boards, Commissions, Coun-
cils and Panels, Committees, and Working Groups. 
The Resolution only allows enhanced participation 
within the Committees2 and Working Groups3.
It is unclear whether and to what extent the Resolu-
tion will impact upon the status of the EU in other UN 
organs, programmes or funds, such as the Human 
Rights Council or World Food Programme, or the 
specialised agencies, such as the World Health Or-
ganisation or the Food and Agriculture Organisation, 
all of which have their own rules of procedure. Each 
UN organ decides whether to grant observer status to 
a non-state body, and the modalities under which the 
latter might participate. This means that the modalities 
of the EU’s observer status vary from organ to organ. 
Therefore, it appears interpretatively consistent to 
2 There are six Committees under the General Assembly: Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee); Special Political 
and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee); Economic and Financial Committee (Second Committee); Social, Humanitarian and Cultural 
Committee (Third Committee); (e) Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee); and the Legal Committee (Sixth Committee). 
3 A list of UN General Assembly Working Group is available at www.un.org/en/ga/about/subsidiary/other.shtml.
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argue that the Resolution does not apply generally in 
the UN system. However, the general title of the Res-
olution, which makes reference to the “work of the 
UN” cautions against any adamant conclusion at 
present. On the other hand it is indisputable that the 
new arrangements do not apply to the Security Coun-
cil. Further, it should be assumed that the Resolution 
is with no prejudice to certain organs within the UN 
family where the EU has already obtained wider par-
ticipation rights than the ones foreseen in the Resolu-
tion. This point, together with the contentious ones 
raised above, remains to be clarified in practice and 
authoritatively by the interpretation of the UN Office of 
Legal Affairs.
the EU Precedent: the Participation of other 
organisations in the Un
While essentially not gaining much from the Resolu-
tion, the EU also made some important concessions. 
In this respect the EU agreed to lower the threshold 
in the Resolution for other regional organisations to 
obtain similar rights in the UNGA. The Resolution 
states that the UNGA may adopt modalities for par-
ticipation of other regional bodies “following a re-
quest on behalf of a regional organisation that has 
observer status in the General Assembly and whose 
Member States have agreed arrangements that al-
low that organisation’s representatives to speak on 
behalf of the organisation and its Member States.” 
This means that a regional organisation such as the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) or African Un-
ion (AU) could seek participation rights similar to 
those obtained by the EU if the organisation’s mem-
bers have allowed the organisation to speak on their 
behalf. This is a far lower threshold than that in 
the corresponding section in the draft of September 
2010. The 2010 draft would only have allowed en-
hanced participation rights for organisations that 
had “reached a level of integration that enables 
that organisation to speak with one voice.”4 The new 
wording is a result of a negotiation involving the EU 
and Caribbean Community, which has stated that it 
would seek similar participation rights in the future.
Future requests for greater participation by regional 
bodies must still be voted upon by the UNGA on a 
case-by-case basis. However, the current Resolution 
sets a precedent that would make it easier for other 
organisations to upgrade their role at the UNGA. Par-
ticipation in international organisations, including the 
UN, is generally limited to states. Where international 
organisations have created an exception to this rule, 
they normally only allow membership for regional or-
ganisations with a relatively high degree of integration 
and decision-making power, such as the EU.5 This 
Resolution effectively lowers the threshold for inter-
governmental organisations to participate within the 
UN bodies. For example, in its Interpretative Declara-
tion, CARICOM stated that “The conferral of identical 
rights [to those given to the EU] is not dependant on 
a duplication of the European Union’s modalities of 
integration, nor is it premised on the achievement of 
any perceived “level” of integration.”
Following the vote, representatives of the Bahamas 
(representing CARICOM), Nigeria (representing the 
AU) and Sudan (representing the Arab League) stat-
ed that the Resolution was a precedent to allow other 
regional bodies to upgrade their participation rights. 
They will likely expect the European Union to be fa-
vourable towards these requests. Greater participa-
tion by these regional bodies will eventually downplay 
the exceptional nature of the EU, which has a higher 
level of integration and decision-making autonomy 
than other regional bodies.
The Resolution also raises questions for the UN. The 
Bahamas argued that the Resolution might create “a 
new category of non-State observer with a unique 
complement of rights and privileges.”6 Smaller 
states, who are given a voice within the UNGA on 
the same level as more powerful ones, feel that this 
voice will be diminished if the UN becomes domi-
nated by regional organisations. Nauru, which did 
not vote, argued that the Resolution posed “serious 
risks” for the organisation and would change the na-
ture of the UN. The Hungarian representative, on be-
half of the EU, sought to allay these fears, stating, 
“As we have agreed from the outset, the UN is, and 
should remain, an organisation of States. The Euro-
pean Union will remain an observer at the General 
Assembly.”7 Yet another criticism was that the EU’s 
enhanced observer status would increase its repre-
4 Draft Resolution A/64/L67 of the UN General Assembly – Participation of the European Union, Annex L. in Emerson et. Al, Upgrading the EU’s 
role as a Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy, Centre for European Studies, 2011.
5 Participation of the European Union within international organizations is often made possible through a specific ‘Regional Economic Integration Or-
ganization Clause’ (REIO clause) that allows entities such as the EU to participate. E.g Article 2(4), Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization
6 Statement by The Bahamas on behalf of CARICOM, 3 May 2011. 
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At the EU borders lie 16 countries whose perspectives and aspirations 
have a direct impact on the former. The events of these past few months 
in Southern Mediterranean countries only accentuate this interdepend-
ence. In this context of change and given the limited results obtained 
through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU has begun 
the process of revising the Policy in order to step up support for the 
political reform underway and provide a more adapted response on a 
case by case basis.
Providing Support for Progress towards Strong democracy
Supporting the deepening of democracy: The level of aid allocat-
ed as support to sound, sustainable democracy will depend on the 
progress made by each country in terms of political reform.
Establishing a Partnership with Society: Developing a plural civil 
society is an indispensable condition for guaranteeing a healthy democ-
racy. Hence, a facility dedicated to civil society (as part of the ENP) 
would allow organisations improved access to EU aid. By the same to-
ken, the establishment of a European Fund for Democracy would stimu-
late the emergence of numerous democratic political actors represent-
ing the plurality of society. Another indispensable issue in a democracy 
is fostering media freedom. In this regard, unhindered access to internet 
by civil society and the use of electronic communications technology 
are essential. Finally, the EU will step up dialogue on human rights.
Intensifying Political Cooperation on Security: The EU intends to 
strengthen its participation in the resolution of protracted conflicts, en-
sure a concerted use of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) as well as other instruments, and promote joint action with ENP 
Partners regarding key security issues in international areas.
Providing Support for Sustainable Economic and Social  
development
Sustainable Economic Growth and Job Creation: To attain these 
goals, the EU will encourage partner countries to adopt policies favour-
able to more sustained, sustainable and inclusive growth, the develop-
ment of Small and Medium-ized Enterprises (SMEs) and micro-enter-
prises and job creation.
Strengthening trade ties: Since the EU is the main export market for 
neighbouring countries, a deep and comprehensive free trade area 
(FTA) with the EU would prove the most effective tool for strengthening 
trade ties. In the long term, the most advanced partners could progress 
towards regional economic integration. In the shorter term, the EU will 
seek to extend trade concessions in existing agreements or negotia-
tions underway in sectors likely to stimulate an immediate recovery in 
the economies of partner countries.
Strengthening Sectoral Cooperation: Cooperation can be strength-
ened in all sectors involved in the domestic market, according to the cri-
terion “more for more.” The areas of cooperation proposed are knowledge 
and innovation, climate change, environment, energy, transportation, 
maritime affairs and information and communication technology.
Migration and Mobility: In these domains, the emphasis is on visa 
facilitation for some partner countries of the ENP and the liberalization 
of the visa regime for the most advanced partners. Thus, the develop-
ment and/or emergence of mobility partnerships would ensure proper 
management of the movement of people between the EU and third 
countries. Finally, the EU encourages member states to fully utilize the 
opportunities offered by the EU Visa Code.
Establishing Efficient regional Partnerships through the EnP
Strengthening the Eastern Partnership: From the EU perspective, 
deep and comprehensive free trade areas are essential for strengthen-
ing political and economic ties with EU partners in the East. In this re-
gard, the EU is planning to launch comprehensive programmes to pro-
vide partner countries with the necessary administrative capacity to 
introduce reforms.
For the Eastern Partnership, topics on the agenda are: further democra-
tization; continuing the visa facilitation and visa regime liberalization 
processes; intensifying sectoral cooperation, particularly in the sphere 
of rural development; and maintaining a substantive dialogue in areas 
such as education, transport and social and employment policies.
Establishing a Partnership for democracy and Shared Prosper-
ity in the South Mediterranean: The ENP should provide an ambi-
tious response to the winds of change blowing in South Mediterranean 
countries. This response is addressed in the joint communication, “A 
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern 
Mediterranean.”
Simplified, Coherent action and Programme Frameworks
Clearer Priorities through More determined Political Leader-
ship: Action plans and relevant EU aid under the ENP will be focused 
on a small number of priorities and more specific benchmarks will be 
introduced.
Financing: The aim is to target the funds slated and programmed 
through the ENPI and other relevant instruments of foreign policy in light 
of the ENP’s new approach. The latter involves the provision of addi-
tional resources of up to 1.242 billion euros by 2013. In addition, re-
sources are to be mobilized to strengthen the budget.
Involving the EIb and the Ebrd: In order to support major infra-
structure projects, stimulate development and address key challenges 
in energy, environment and transport, we must ensure that the EIB and 
other regional banks have sufficient financial resources. Therefore, the 
EU proposes expanding the EIB and the EBRD’s lending possibilities, in 
particular by the extension of the latter’s mandate to certain southern 
partners.
Planning for 2013 and beyond: With regard to the post-2013 finan-
cial framework, the future European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) 
will provide most of the budget support to Partner Countries. The pro-
cedure for obtaining financing through the ENI should be more flexible 
and simpler and the conditions stricter in order to allow greater differen-
tiation between the countries receiving aid.
Finally, coordination efforts will have to be stepped up between the EU, 
its Member States and other international financial institutions (IFIs) and 
significant bilateral donors to maximize external support to the reform 
agenda established within the context of the ENP.
For further information:
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf
a nEW StratEGY For a nEIGHboUrHood In tranSForMatIon
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sentation when Europe is already viewed by many as 
over-represented in international fora. Nauru argued 
that the EU would effectively gain a “28th seat” 
through the Resolution. Again, the EU sought to allay 
these concerns by giving assurances that the new 
modalities would not negatively affect the rights of 
States to address the General Assembly.
It is necessary to keep in mind the dynamics within 
the UN and the institutional culture in order to ex-
plain the objections raised by different states and 
micro-states in the process of consultations. Mem-
ber States of other regional organisations did not 
share identical preferences in the negotiation. How-
ever, it can be safely argued that their primary inter-
est lies in safeguarding the intergovernmental nature 
of the UN and the UNGA as a guarantee of their 
sovereignty mirrored in their institutionally unre-
strained capacity to make foreign policy at the UN 
and to codetermine decisions. In the UNGA their 
vote counts and they are determined to safeguard 
this right. Simultaneously, they perceived this nego-
tiation as an opportunity to upgrade the status of 
their regional organisations in the GA in the future.
How the EU is Viewed Externally
This saga illustrates the diverging views on the type 
of actor the EU is within the international system. It is 
clear that the EU viewed the changes as merely ‘pro-
cedural’ whereas other states saw them as a threat 
to their interests and to the intergovernmental nature 
of the UN as a whole.
The Lisbon Treaty created a foreign policy architec-
ture that would allow the EU to speak with one voice 
on the international plane, creating permanent posi-
tions such as the President of the European Council 
and the High Representative. However, to make use 
of these changes, the EU has sought to adjust the 
rules of the international organisations in which it 
participates. This has meant that the Lisbon reform 
now carries with it an external dimension, whereby 
the EU must persuade other UN Member States to 
allow its greater participation in international fora. Its 
inability to do this seems to be one of the reasons for 
the watered-down text of the Resolution. As evi-
denced by the shocking rebuff it received in Sep-
tember 2010, the EU underestimated the opposition 
that such a proposal would generate, whereas it had 
an inflated view of its international stature as a global 
actor.
In Europe, the EU is viewed as a supranational or-
ganisation with a distinct legal personality and a high 
level of autonomy. Yet the debates within the UNGA 
show that externally the EU is still viewed as a Euro-
pean ‘bloc’ virtually indistinguishable from its Mem-
ber States. A UN press release following the vote, 
for example, repeatedly describes the Union as a 
‘bloc’8. As discussed above, the text of the Resolu-
tion also attests to this. The EU may now present 
proposals “as agreed by the Member States of the 
European Union” and these can only be put to a vote 
“at the request of a Member State.” This language 
does not present the EU as an autonomous global 
actor, but one that remains tied to its Member States.
Conclusion
Rather than being seen as a diplomatic victory at the 
UN, the latest resolution should at best be seen as the 
beginning of a greater diplomatic effort to upgrade 
the EU’s role in the World Organisation. The impact of 
the Resolution will only be known once we see how it 
will be used in practice. As evidenced by the restric-
tive interpretation by CARICOM, some states will 
seek to use the resolution to restrict the EU’s partici-
patory role. The EU must forcefully insist on exercising 
its rights, otherwise these hard-fought changes will 
be a hollow victory. This negotiation also highlights 
the actual standing of the EU in global politics. The 
international community apparently does not conceive 
the EU as a powerful actor capable of pursuing and 
achieving its central goals without bending to pres-
sure. The fact that the EU found itself obliged to ne-
gotiate sometimes from an inferior position with mi-
cro-states is highly illustrative in this respect. Lastly, 
there remains a question over the extent to which the 
EU has to be ready to flex its economic muscles when 
this is absolutely necessary. It is inconceivable for the 
world’s number one donor of development aid to be 
unable to relatively easily secure the support of the 
majority of states in the UNGA on an issue of instru-
mental importance to it.
7 General Statement on behalf of the European Union by H.E. Mr. Csaba Kőrösi, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Hungary, at the United 
Nations General Assembly 65th Session, 88th Plenary meeting on "Strengthening of the United Nations system: draft resolution (A/65/L.64/Rev.1).
8 General Assembly GA/11079/Rev. 1*, 3 May 2011.
